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Abstract
Multilevel marketing companies (MLMs) — sales organizations that
compensate independent consultants based on the sales and recruitment of
other consultants — form a significant part of the American economy. Yet,
MLMs provide little information to regulators and potential participants
regarding potentially material information. Although MLMs are often
compared to pyramid schemes, consultants argue that participation in a
MLM allows them to make money outside of the traditional full-time labor
force. This paper examines the law, economics, and psychology of MLMs,
suggesting that MLMs may draw on prospective consultants’ cognitive
biases in persuading consultants to join and continue a MLM. Consultants
may be led to focus on unlikely benefits and to conform to notions of success
that seem consistent with the “American dream” — even to their financial
loss.

* Ph.D. Student, Harvard University (Public Policy); J.D. 2017, Harvard Law School; A.B. 2011,
Harvard College (Economics). Many thanks to Professor Oren Bar-Gill for his valuable comments.
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Upon entering the homepage of American Communication Network,
LLC (better known as ACN), you are greeted with one sentence: “Stop
waiting for life to happen and create it — with ACN!”1 You have three
options to proceed:
1. A large arrow that says “Start Today”
2. The phrase “Learn More” at the bottom of the page
3. In small, nearly transparent letters, the word “Scroll” (i.e., scroll
down)2
Clicking “Start Today” takes you immediately to a “convenient online
form” with a $499 application fee: A lengthy “ACN Independent Business
Owner Agreement,” that is signed with the last four digits of your Social
Security Number — without having provided your name.3 On the other
hand, clicking the “Learn More” button leads you to a contact form with the
caveat that “if you first heard about ACN from an Independent Business
Owner, contact that person for more information.”4
Choosing to scroll down leads you to a segment that asks: “What if you
got paid every time someone talked on the phone, watched television, sent
text messages, surfed the internet, swiped a credit card, or used natural gas
or electricity? ACN’s home-based business provides an opportunity to earn
income on the services people are already using every day.”5
Finally, scrolling down further, you find a caption for a charity logo that
states: “Every time someone becomes an ACN customer, a child gets fed”6
and another quote from an ACN consultant: “I try never to think of what I
will do next week or next month, but always today. That has always helped
me get closer to my long-term goals.”7 Alongside these quotes are links to
other parts of the website — but no search function to find other information
about the company.8
It took approximately twenty minutes exploring the website for this
author to find a list of the services ACN provides.9 These services include
telecommunications, home security, and energy utilities — a fairly broad

1. ACN, http://www.acninc.com [https://perma.cc/W4BQ-EDEY].
2. ACN, supra note 1.
3. ACN Independent Business Owner Agreement, ACN, https://myacn2.acninc.com/On
LineRepAgreem-ent/RepAgrmStart.do?init=false [https://perma.cc/73H3-YHU9].
4. ACN Contact Form, ACN, http://acnreview.com/leads/?CO_LA=US_EN [https://perma.
cc/VUC9-FNMX].
5. ACN, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See ACN, https://www.myacn.com/ [https://perma.cc/4GEJ-JL2S].
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portfolio.10 It took another few minutes to find how Independent Business
Owners earn money, as the Compensation Plan is only accessible within the
Agreements. As an ACN Independent Business Owner — not a salesperson
— you receive a portion of sales from customers. If an Owner recruits others
to become Owners, he receives a portion of their sales from customers. The
more customers Owners and their recruits have, the higher percentage of
commissions you earn.11
ACN, with revenues of $800 million in 2016,12 is just one example of a
multilevel marketing company (called a “MLM”): A company that not only
markets goods and services through direct sales, but also incentivizes its
consultants to recruit other potential consultants.13 In a MLM, consultants
are considered non-employees of the company,14 and the incentives may be
aligned in such a way that it may be more profitable for consultants to recruit
others than to sell products.15 In contrast, traditional salespeople are
employed by companies and are paid a combination of a base salary and
bonuses, based on how much inventory they or their team are able to sell.16
Perhaps it is for this reason that the websites of ACN and other prominent
MLMs17 provide a similar emphasis on the opportunity to become a
consultant rather than the products themselves.18

10. See id.
11. North American Compensation Plan Overview, ACN, http://www2.acninc.com/join/301.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FQB7-N2UT].
12. ACN, Inc. Ranked Among the Largest Direct Selling Companies in the World for 8th Straight
Consecutive Year, ACN, http://acninc.com/news/press-releases/2016/04/28/acn-ranked-among-largestdirect-sellers [https://perma.cc/X6ES-NCJU].
13. Participants involved with MLM companies may go by a variety of names — consultants,
distributors, owners, or contractors. In this paper, I use the term consultants to refer to any participant.
See Wesley K. Dagestad, Note, Day’s Pyramid Ignores Sturdy Severability Foundation, Builds off
Granite Rock, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 349 n.2 (2014).
14. See Joel Busher, Sophie Bremner, and Paramita Muljono, Freedom, Family, Hope and
Rewards? Points of Departure for Development Studies Research on Direct Selling (U. Anglia Sch. Int’l
Dev., Working Paper No. 16, 2009).
15. See ACN, supra note 11. Consultants are paid a higher percentage of sales the more customer
points they have. Customer points are based on the number of customers and recruits a consultant has.
If you assume that a recruit has at least one customer, then it is in the consultant’s interest to recruit rather
than to sell to a customer.
16. See, e.g., Thomas Steenburgh and Michael Ahearne, Motivating Sales People: What Really
Works, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/07/motivating-salespeople-what-reallyworks [https://perma.cc/R2CU-7N2L].
17. Compare ACN, supra note 1, with, e.g., AMWAY, http://www.amway.com/ [https://
perma.cc/APH5-5ZLN], and LULAROE, http://www.lularoe.com/ [https://perma.cc/YV6G-X755].
18. See, e.g., AMWAY, supra note 17 (where the first front page states “Build your knowledge, build
your business”), SCENTSY, http://www.scentsy.com [https://perma.cc/PP7R-46SZ] (where a prominent
arrow points to a consultant application).
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As much as MLMs sell items (or people), they are also selling a distant
opportunity. The majority of MLM consultants are likely to lose money
from their participation. There is little public data regarding the MLM
industry19 — much less MLM’s per capita revenues — aside from what is
disclosed in litigation.20 However, 87.5% of Herbalife consultants earned a
median annual income of $637,21 and of all sellers that made any profit,
median earnings in addition to retail profits, if any, were $245 for the year.22
There appears to be no data regarding the share of income from recruitment
(directly or indirectly), compared to sales;23 however, in a 2013 appeal, the
FTC argued that an emphasis on recruitment led to a net loss for 94% of
consultants in one company.24 Consultants’ earnings are garnished by
various expenses, further depreciating their income. In addition to pursuing
prospective consultants, consultants often must purchase a training kit
(which, in some cases, could run up to $50025). After training, they are
expected to purchase ongoing promotional items (e.g., catalogs and display
kits) or pay a subscription fee for their participation.26 A back-of-theenvelope subtraction of these costs from the little revenue data we have
suggests that a substantial number of consultants have a net loss.

19. See William W. Keep and Peter J. Vander Nat, Multilevel Marketing and Pyramid Schemes in
the U.S.: An Historical Analysis, 6 J. HIST. RES. IN MARKETING 188, 203 (2014); Sergio Pareja, Sales
Gone Wild: Will the FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule Put an End to Pyramid Marketing Schemes?, 39
MCGEORGE L.REV. 85, 96 (2008).
20. See Keep, supra note 19, at 2034–55.
21. Melanie Hicken, The Money Behind Herbalife, Mary Kay, and Others, CNN (Jan. 10, 2013,
1:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/09/pf/multilevel-marketing-industry/ [https://perma.cc/6RZJQF2W].
22. What Should I Know About Herbalife Membership?, HERBALIFE, http://www.herbal
ife.com/Conten-t/en-US/pdf/business-opportunity/statement-of-average-gross-compensation-usen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FXR-4Y6D].
23. Data comparing recruitment income to sales income would be useful information to have, as a
large share of revenue from recruitment would help to distinguish MLMs from other sales opportunities.
24. Second Cross-Appeal and Answering Brief at 30–31, FTC v. Burnlounge, 753 F.3d 878 (9th
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-55926, 12-56197, 12-56288 (consolidated)).
25. If the MLMs had a training kit over $500, it would need to comply with the FTC’s Franchise
Rule. See Pareja, supra note 19, at 92. In my research, all kits were below $500. Herbalife’s kit was
$59.99.
26. See also Jayne O’Donnell, Multilevel Marketing or ‘Pyramid’? Sales People Find it Hard to
Earn Much, USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 2011, 8:48 PM), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/
reta-il/2011-02-07-multilevelmarketing03_CV_N.htm/ [https://perma.cc/SP7X-LYNY]. I was unable to
determine how much Herbalife promotional items would cost without signing up (it may vary across
area). However, another MLM charges $14.95 monthly for their subscription fee. See THIRTY-ONE
GIFTS, https://www.mythirtyone.com/info/join [https://perma.cc/NZ5P-YEL7]. See part III infra for an
extended discussion on this issue.
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Indeed, accusations abound online that both prominent27 and obscure28
MLMs are scams;29 both the FTC30 and various states31 post collections of
Frequently Asked Questions (FQAs) meant to help people discern if a MLM
they are considering is worthwhile. Specifically, MLMs are compared to
pyramid schemes given similarities in organizational structure (i.e., the
incentive to recruit new people means that only a few people will make large
profits). While not all MLM schemes are illegal pyramid schemes and vice
versa, both MLMs and pyramid schemes may draw from the literature on
influence in recruiting consultants that may override a rational actor’s
decision to participate.
Behavioral economics presents a potential explanation for why people
might choose to enter a MLM despite the lack of information from both the
industry and individual companies. This interdisciplinary approach drawing
from law, psychology, and economics has been applied to a variety of
domains32 and has a close relationship with advertising itself — as both of
these fields draw inspiration from one another.33 This paper seeks to
examine the behavioral economics of multilevel marketing companies
(“MLMs”). Part I serves as a brief overview of the structure and potential
enforcement of these companies. Part II considers under what conditions a
rational consumer might choose to participate in a MLM. Part III delineates
how behavioral biases might cause someone to participate in a MLM in the
face of incomplete information, drawing from examples from ACN, one of
the largest MLMs by revenue,34 as well as others. In particular, I suggest
27. See Roger Parloff, Herbalife Deal Poses Challenges For the Industry, FORTUNE MAG. (July
19, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/19/herbalife-deal-challenges-industry/ [https://perma.cc/H7L5TQYX].
28. See Reddit: MLM Scams, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/mlmscams/ [https://perma.cc/
EE7M-BC2K].
29. See infra, Part III.
30. See FTC, Multilevel Marketing (July 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/businesscenter/guidance/multilevel-marketing [https://perma.cc/Z3PW-BQJ7].
31. See, e.g., Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Consumer Alert: Multi-Level Marketing or Illegal
Pyramid Scheme?, STATE OF MICHIGAN, http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-17337_20942208400--,00.html [https://perma.cc/PS5W-G9ZA].
32. See, e.g., RICHARD THALER AND CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ. Press 2008); OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY
CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
While NUDGE covers over ten different fields (including, e.g., health, environment, and financial
markets), the ideas expressed in the book catalyzed innovation all over.
33. See, e.g., Matt Carmichael, Making the Most of Our Irrationality, ADVERTISING AGE (Sept. 21,
2010), http://adage.com/article/adagestat/advertising-dan-ariely-behavioral-economics-marketing/14600
1/ [https://perma.cc/5JGJ-KMV9].
34. 2016 DSN North America 50 List, DIRECT SELLING NEWS (June 1, 2016), http://direct
sellingnews.c-om/index.php/view/2016_dsn_north_america_50_list1 [https://perma.cc/9KT3-4C6H].
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that MLMs engage in both incomplete disclosure about expected economic
benefits, while simultaneously deemphasizing the importance of economic
benefits relative to a set of values that they believe consultants should
develop. Both of these techniques rely on and exacerbate consultants’
behavioral biases. Finally, Part IV concludes by considering existing
regulatory policies and further areas of study.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. DEFINING MLMS
Multilevel marketing companies (“MLMs”) are defined as a subset of
direct-sales companies.35 The multilevel reference in the acronym comes
from the fact that consultants proceed up levels associated with increased
commissions as they acquire more customers and recruit more consultants.36
MLMs sell a variety of goods and services, from health and beauty
products,37 to clothing,38 and financial39 services, with “an estimated $34.47
billion in retail sales, and . . . 18.2 million direct selling distributors, in the
U.S. in 2014.”40 The vast majority of distributors appear to be part-time41
and female.42

35. Direct-sell companies are companies that directly sell products and services to the end-user
without a retailer. See Peter J. Vander Nat and William W. Keep, Marketing Fraud: An Approach for
Differentiating Multilevel Marketing from Pyramid Schemes, 21 J. PUB POL’Y & MARKETING 139, 140
(2002).
36. See ibid.
37. See, e.g., AMWAY, supra note 17; HERBALIFE, http://www.herbalife.com/ [https://perma.cc/
M2TH-LLEC], RODAN + FIELDS, http://www.rodanandfields.com [https://perma.cc/YG5R-RTW8].
38. See, e.g., LULAROE, supra note 17; CABI, http://www.cabiclothing.com [https://perma.cc
/9H7X-V3R4].
39. See, e.g., PRIMERICA, http://www.primerica.com [https://perma.cc/N5KA-UMCL].
40. Anne T. Coughlan, Multi-Level Marketing Business Opportunities: Analyzing Net Economic
Return and Avoidable Economic Loss to Distributors, 1 (July 15, 2016) (citing statistics from the Direct
Sales Association’s defunct link), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822402 [https://perma.cc/UK69-LSSS].
41. Id. at 2.
42. “Some 75% of U.S. MLM distributors in 2014 were women, and almost 90 percent worked
only part-time on their businesses.” Id. at 1. Indeed, the MLM industry appears consistently threequarters feminine, based on earlier statistics. See John Bone, “The Longest Day”: “Flexible” Contracts,
Performance-related Pay and Risk Shifting in the UK Direct Selling Sector, 20 WORK, EMPLOYMENT
AND SOCIETY 109, 111 (2006) (citing Nicole Woolsey Biggart, CHARISMATIC CAPITALISM (1989)).
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B. COMPARISON TO PYRAMID SCHEMES
MLMs and pyramid schemes partially overlap: Some MLM companies
are pyramid schemes and some pyramid schemes consist of MLM
companies. The resemblance between the two is made salient by the
organizational structure: Pyramid schemes ask those individuals at the base
of the pyramid to contribute to the higher levels, with the promise of a reward
provided entirely from those levels below the individual. Similarly, MLMs
offer the promise of profits to its consultants, but those profits stem from two
streams: Commissions from direct sales and commissions from recruiting
new clients. Indeed, one early article attempting to distinguish pyramid
schemes from MLM models pointed out that “the investor's pecuniary
benefit [of a pyramid scheme] derives primarily from his success in inducing
additional persons to participate in the plan.”43
C. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND MLMS.
Enforcement against MLMs with problematic business tactics is
primarily triggered through allegations that the MLMs employ pyramid sales
schemes. Prosecution methods crosscut agencies (e.g., Department of
Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission)
and approaches. Overlaid on this framework are potential state law liabilities
under each state’s lottery and consumer fraud acts.44 The following is a
general overview of three prosecution approaches categorized as (1) the
lottery approach, pursued by the DOJ, (2) the securities approach, pursued
by the SEC and state enforcement bodies, and (3) an assortment of
consumer-directed approaches pursued by the FTC.
First, under the lottery approach, spearheaded by the DOJ, the
investigation centers on three elements: Consideration, prize, and chance —
that is, whether the victim has given funds to the company, how much the
company benefits, and how much the victim may benefit from his or her
consideration.45 Historically, chance has been the most difficult element to

43. Donald Daniels, Note, Toward a Uniform Approach to Multilevel Distributorships, 8 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 546, 547 (1975).
44. See id. at 559. As of 2010, more than half of states have enacted laws specifically targeting
MLMs. See Adam Epstein, Multi-Level Marketing and its Brethren: The Legal and Regulatory
Environment in the Down Economy, 12 ATLANTIC L.J. 91, 93 (2010). See also Keith Kanouse, Business
Opportunity Rule Means Less Disclosure, but by More Companies, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 125, 130 (2007).
45. See Daniels, supra note 43, at 552.
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prove.46 Another DOJ-driven approach includes prosecution under mail
order fraud, although this strategy is less frequent.47
Second, the securities approach utilizes federal and state securities laws
that are violated when an MLM makes materially false or misleading
statements in connection with a security — an infringing MLM is said to
have sold a security in the form of an investment contract to its consultants.
The Securities and Exchange Commission investigates MLMs by pursuing
fraud claims under the Securities Act, Securities Exchange Act, and its
associated regulations.48 These claims depend on whether the scheme is
construed to be a security (i.e., the customer “is not required to make
significant efforts in the operation of the franchise in order to obtain the
promised return.”49) The four-prong test derived from SEC v. W.J. Howey
delineates the Supreme Court’s definition of a security: When an individual
“(1) invests his money (2) in a common enterprise and (3) is led to expect
profits (4) solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third party.”50 With
regard to alleged pyramid schemes, the fourth prong is most relevant51 and,
under SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, the scheme’s profits must not
substantially — rather than solely, as articulated in Howey — rely on
recruitment.52
Some states use a “risk capital test” to determine whether a MLM sells
a security under state securities laws.53 In such states, the four-prong test
operates as follows:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a
portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced
by the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a
reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind,
over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a
result of the operation of the enterprise, and (4) the offeree does
46. See ibid. (citing generally Zebelman v. United States, 339 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1964)).
47. Id. at 553.
48. Id. at 554.
49. Id. (citing SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5211 (1971); SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 9387 (1971)).
50. Douglas M. Fried, General Partnership Interests as Securities Under the Federal Securities
Laws: Substance Over Form, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 309 (1985) (citing SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293,
298–299 (1946)).
51. See Pareja, supra note 19 at 99.
52. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 481–83 (9th Cir. 1973). See Daniels, supra
note 43, at 555; Pareja, supra note 19, at 99–100.
53. Pareja, supra note 19, at 100.
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not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over
the managerial decisions of the enterprise.54
Ignoring both the Howey test and the “risk capital test,” the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken a third, more literal
approach, holding that any pyramid structure should be construed as a
security — this third test is known as a pyramid-scheme analysis, looking at
whether the entity is or is not a pyramid scheme and thus a security.55
Overall, despite the variations in the state and federal tests, whether
something is a security is generally interpreted very broadly.56
Third, the FTC has multiple pathways for enforcement against a MLM
alleged to be a pyramid scheme. It may look to the Sherman Act in arguing
that the distributor and the business essentially act as the same entity.57
Alternatively, the FTC may challenge an alleged pyramid scheme under
Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits deceptive acts in commerce.58 In
the well-known case regarding MLM companies, In re Amway Corp., Inc.,
et al.,59 the FTC ruled that Amway had “avoided the abuses of pyramid
schemes” by requiring that a consultant must sell 70% of her inventory to 10
different customers each month in order to receive a performance bonus, and
providing an opportunity for consultants to sell back inventory to Amway.60
This trifecta of rules, known as the Amway Safeguards,61 provided a test for
courts determining whether a MLM company is functionally acting as a
pyramid scheme.62 In general, it appears that courts are quite deferential to
this standard.63 More recent cases add two indicia to whether a MLM
business may be operating a pyramid scheme: Whether it provides “lumpsum payments for each new recruit”64 and whether it provides “rewards
based on volume purchased by recruits,” as these are unrelated to product

54. Ibid. (citing Hawaii v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971)).
55. See ibid. (citing Webster v. Omnitrition International, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 781–82 (9th Cir.
1996)).
56. Epstein, supra note 44, at 117.
57. Daniels, supra note 43, at 556–557.
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); Daniels, supra note 43, at 557.
59. In re Amway Corp., Inc., et al., 93 F.T.C. 618 (1979).
60. Id. at 668.
61. Pareja, supra note 19 at 95.
62. See, e.g., Whole Living, Inc. v. Tolman, 344 F. Supp. 2d 739, 745–746 (D. Utah Nov. 9, 2004)
(Judge Ted Stewart).
63. Epstein, supra note 44, at 104.
64. Keep, supra note 19, at 198 (citing generally FTC et al. v. Fortune Hi-Tech Marketing et al.,
Civil No. 13 CV 578 (N.D. Ill. 2013)).
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sales,65 such that a consultant’s compensation is largely derived from new
recruits.66
Altogether, under Amway and related decisions, a court will balance the
following factors to determine whether a MLM enterprise is an illegal
pyramid scheme:
1. Products have “no real world marketplace” and the marketing
program is a cover for a scam;
2. Products are sold at inflated prices;
3. That there is a substantial “buy-in” qualification, also known as
“inventory loading” or “front-loading,” for the membership;
4. That there is an initial cash investment over $500;
5. That members must purchase ancillary products or services to
remain in the program;
6. Whether the MLM has an inventory repurchase policy in the event
that the member leaves the MLM;
7. That the emphasis is, or has become, more focused on rewards for
recruiting than selling goods or services; and
8. Whether there are misrepresentations related to membership
earnings claims or outright misrepresentations related to potential
income by the member.67
II. A (POTENTIALLY) RATIONAL EXPLANATION.
One novel aspect of MLM companies is that the consultant is himself a
good because his existence is a source of revenue to other consultants, either
directly, through a recruitment fee, or indirectly, through his sales. This may
mean that the incentives for MLMs and higher-status consultants (i.e., those
who could have recruited others in an unsaturated market) are largely
misaligned with those of lower-status consultants. Specifically, the former
category would receive revenue from the lower-status consultants’
recruitment-fee generation as well as through their inventory purchases, and
it may be possible that the revenue from recruitment fees exceeds customer

65. See ibid. (citing generally FTC v. Equinox Int’l. Corp., 1999 WL 1425373 (D. Nev. 1999); FTC
v. Trek Alliance, 81 Fed.Appx. 118 (9th Cir. 2003)).
66. See id. at 199.
67. Epstein, supra note 44, at 105–106 (summarizing Jeffrey A. Babener, FTC v. Equinox — Déjà
Vu, (1999) http://www.mlmlegal.com/equinox.html [https://perma.cc/5CQZ-N3CG ]).
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purchases. As one scholar points out: “[F]or MLM companies, there is no
cost and, in some cases, failure still generates a profit.”68
Altogether, a rational actor, i.e., a homo economius,69 that is considering
the entry into a MLM market would want to engage in a cost-benefit analysis,
comparing the costs of entry relative to the benefits. Of course, an
individual’s utility function differs from those of another, so I examine two
situations: (a) Where the prospective consultant is only considering
economic costs and benefits and (b) where the prospect is also incorporating
certain noneconomic considerations into her decision.
In the first situation, the prospective consultant would calculate the costs
of the startup package (e.g., training and inventory) against the anticipated
benefits of sales. If the expected sales were greater than the startup package,
and the sales were greater than her outside option (e.g., salary at another job
or the value she places on leisure time), then she would enter the MLM.70
Indeed, if she believed that the training that the MLM offered was noncompany specific industry capital, she might value the training more highly.
Even if she did not have full information about the MLM, she would need
information about the risk or uncertainty involved.
In the second situation, the prospective consultant might enter the MLM
if she valued certain aspects of the job differently. For instance, a stay-athome mom might welcome the opportunity to stay involved in traditional
market labor. In both of these situations, it would be economically rational
for an individual to decide to enter the MLM.
As a potential homo-economius consultant weighs her options, she
would probably value information about the average profits per consultant
and the trajectory over time. As one economic model notes, even if a
consultant is uninformed about how productive she will be (e.g., low vs. high
productivity), knowing the average performance of a consultant can help her
to make a calculated risk.71

68. Brian Bloch, Multilevel Marketing: What’s the Catch?, 13 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 18, 25
(1996).
69. See generally, Richard Thaler, From Homo Economius to Homo Sapiens, 14 J. ECON. PERSP.
133–141 (2000), for an example of this term in a behavioral economics context.
70. See Coughlan, supra note 40, at 12. It might also be possible that a distributor derives utility
from consuming her own products, see id. at 2. For example, several consultants I know personally
indicated that they became consultants because they wanted a discount on certain beauty products and
clothing. However, if this were the case for all — or the majority of — consultants, then MLM companies
would simply be termed “buyer’s clubs.” See Keep, supra note 19, at 204.
71. See Coughlan, supra note 40, at 13. The author notes that MLM companies could have low
startup costs in order for potential consultants to try out the program and figure out whether they are lowor high-productivity type, id.
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In addition, the prospective consultant might want to know how many
consultants are in her networks. For instance, if everyone in her community
was already a consultant, then her expected profits might be lower as there
are fewer available people to recruit. She may also have prior beliefs about
other consultants’ rationality, either viewing the other surrounding
consultants as largely rational or largely irrational (i.e., overly optimistic
about earning a profit). If she believes the latter, then it seems possible that
she plans to “ride a bubble” — making a profit from consultants she expects
will fail.72 This plan, however, would likely constitute fraud and thus require
the significant assumption that she is willing to defraud her targeted
consultants.
That said, these beliefs may differ throughout the levels of a MLM. In
particular, recruits that have recently joined may believe that other
consultants are largely rational. After all, longtime consultants appear to be
making money, they themselves are likely to believe that their own decision
to join was rational,73 and they must have some belief in the success of the
consultants they recruit. (In legal MLMs, the portion of commissions and
bonuses increase based on the number of individuals you recruit, but, the
MLM cannot directly pay a consultant for recruiting new individuals.)74 The
MLM’s marketing reinforces these beliefs.75 At higher levels of a MLM,
consultants may be more likely to believe that others are irrational, as they
may have witnessed greater amounts of turnover or are more likely to
recognize that at least some of their consultants will fail.
Compounding confusion, MLM companies appear resistant to providing
additional information to customers or regulators about the industry. In
2006, the FTC attempted to establish the business opportunity rule, which
appeared to be a response to pyramid schemes’ exception from enforcement
under the franchise rule.76 For a company that solicited potential consultants,
72. See BAR-GILL, supra note 32, at 153 n. 84; Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, Bubbles
and Crashes, 71 ECONOMETRICA 173, 174–175 (2003).
73. I.e., a post-hoc justification.
74. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Pyramid Schemes: International Monetary Funds Seminar
on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks (May 13, 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/public-state
ments/1998/05/pyramid-schemes [https://perma.cc/W9E5-GL9J].
75. In Part III, I discuss how the idea of grit might double-down on consultants’ beliefs on others’
rationality — examples of failure are seen as lack of work ethic, not as bounded rationality revealed.
76. Business Opportunity Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 19054 (proposed Apr. 12, 2006) (to be codified 16
C.F.R. pt. 437). Until the business opportunity rule was later implemented in 2012, MLMs could, in
theory, have been forced to comply with the franchise rule, which states that businesses must provide
material information to potential purchases (here, consultants) to provide them with an informed decision;
this information includes “a statistical analysis of existing outlets of the business; whether companyowned or franchised.” Pareja, supra note 19 at 92. However, MLM models often fell within the
exceptions to the franchise rule, as the franchise rule has exceptions for business opportunities that do
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required some form of consideration, and offered to “buy back … any or all
of the goods or services[,]”77 the rule would have required the provision of a
disclosure document to the prospective consultant.78 That disclosure would
include “information about the seller; the business background of the seller’s
principals and their litigation and bankruptcy histories; [and] the terms and
conditions of the offer.”79 It would also require “statistical analyses of
existing franchised and company-owned outlets.”80
To simplify the process, the disclosure was to be limited to one page.81
Moreover, the company would be asked to simply check “yes” or “no” to
whether it had made an earnings claim,82 “been the subject of any civil or
criminal action for misrepresentation,”83 or offered a cancellation policy.84
If a company checked yes to any of these questions, it would have to attach
additional information about the claims, legal actions, or cancellation
policy.85 These requirements and the design of the form itself could be
interpreted as incorporating aspects of behavioral economics, with an eye
towards how individuals might interpret large amounts of complex
information.86
During the notice and comment period, however, the FTC received
thousands of form letters from MLM consultants.87 Given the Amway
Safeguards’ implication that legal MLMs should buy back their consultants’
unsold inventory,88 the Business Opportunity Rule’s inclusion of companies
that “buy back goods or services” appeared to bring all MLM companies
under the umbrella of the Rule.89 In 2008, the FTC chose to exclude MLMs
from regulation by the Rule and to eliminate questions regarding legal
actions against a company’s employees.90
not, require immediate upfront costs of more than $500, or if the costs relate to wholesale selling, training
or returnable invento, see ibid. For instance, if registration fees were set at $499, the franchise rule would
not apply.
77. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 19062.
78. Pareja, supra note 19, at 108–09.
79. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 19055.
80. Ibid.
81. Id. at 19091.
82. Id. at 19058.
83. Or whether its affiliates had been the subject of legal action. Id. at 19088.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. However, the disclosures could be written in a way to be confusing. Part IV briefly discusses
the shortcomings of this approach.
87. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 76816, 76818 n.21 (Dec. 8, 2011)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437).
88. See In re Amway Corp., Inc., et al., 93 F.T.C. 618, 669 (1979).
89. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 76831.
90. See id. at 76819.
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As scholars anticipated,91 it appears that industry lobbyists were part of
this successful protest against extending enforcement under the Rule to
MLMs.92 But the fact that short sellers in 2006 were prepared to sell stock
from publicly held MLMs93 suggests that experts might believe that
disclosure of further information would hurt revenue, and in turn, consultant
entry into the market, as well as earnings per consultant (given that product
sales depend wholly on consultants). To better understand such beliefs and
how disclosure policies like the proposed FTC rule would affect MLMs, a
behavioral economics perspective provides a fruitful lens. Even if MLMs
provided further information to prospective consultants, they are likely to do
so in a way that shapes the preferences of the prospective consultant,
especially with regard to how the prospect perceives the information (what I
term imperfect disclosure). Additionally, the MLMs may exploit similar
biases through a potential consultant’s desire to conform to a particular
religious or gender identity.
III. A BEHAVIORAL MODEL
In the following two sections, I look at how MLM disclosures to
consultants exploit the consultants’ underlying behavioral biases, as well as
how MLMs target consultants’ identities to exploit those same biases.
A. IMPERFECT DISCLOSURE
In this section, I define “imperfect disclosure” as the combination of (1)
design choices by a MLM to influence prospective consultants into joining
and (2) the cognitive biases that consumers might demonstrate in the process.
Specifically, I suggest that at recruitment, MLMs strategically deploy design
choices that appeal to emotion and engage in base-rate neglect (i.e.,
overreliance on successful but unlikely examples),94 altogether appealing to
“present bias,” i.e., the behavioral economics concept that individuals
strongly prefer rewards in the present.95 Recall again the prominently
displayed quote from an ACN consultant: “I try never to think of what I will
91. See Pareja, supra note 19, at 107.
92. See Herb Greenberg, How Multi-Level Marketers Dodged a Bullet, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2013, 4:25
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100360456 [https://perma.cc/WP8K-WWMG].
93. See Charles Duhigg, Why Short Sellers Want to Crash the Tupperware Party, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2006, at C1.
94. See generally Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–1125 (1974).
95. See generally, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON.
443–477 (1997).
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do next week or next month, but always today. That has always helped me
get closer to my long-term goals.”96 After a prospective consultant signs a
contract with the MLM company, the inertia bias and projected bias ensure
her continued participation.
1. During Recruitment
A potential consultant may be recruited in multiple ways, including
either through a friend who seeks to offer a new opportunity or through coldcall advertising.97 It appears — likely due to the in-person nature of MLM
— that generally, printed information is vaguely written on MLM websites.98
For instance, on the ACN website, if you do not wish to sign the New
Business Owner Agreement immediately, you are asked for your email and
phone contact information so that a consultant may contact you.99
MLM company events, with an ambiance similar to religious revivals,
are a large part of recruiting.100 These events play on the likelihood that
people are often more present biased in highly charged situations101 due to
cognitive overload.102 In particular, the emotional intensity of the event may
heighten prospective consultants’ propensity to invest in a MLM.
At these company events, extremely successful consultants are brought
on stage to discuss their experience with the company as a real-life parallel
to testimonials found online. The focus on in-person testimonials of this sort
is an example of base-rate neglect — when individuals focus on specific
incidents rather than average, baseline data103 — as enabled by the company.
That is, only the most successful outcomes are shown and almost no
information is distributed regarding the average or distribution of salaries.
Large samples of data seem to be specifically, not randomly, selected:
During litigation, Herbalife reported gross earnings from a subset of
“eligible” distributors, but did not disclose the eligibility requirements.104 A
full distribution of salary data, of course, would provide more valuable (and
possibly different) information: One empirical study finds that “the bottom
96. ACN, supra note 7.
97. See Daniels, supra note 43, at 550.
98. See, e.g., LULAROE, supra note 17; CABI, supra note 38.
99. ACN, supra note 3.
100. I.e., music, professional lighting and motivational speakers. See, e.g., ACN, supra note 1.
101. See generally David DeSteno et al., Discrete Emotions and Persuasion: The Role of EmotionInduced Expectancies, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 43–56 (2004).
102. See generally ELDAR SHAFIR AND SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO
LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH (Times Books 2013).
103. See generally Tversky, supra note 94.
104. See Keep, supra note 19, at 204.
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99% of all Arbonne distributors earned an average income of $87.36
annually whereas the top .04% earned an average income of $330,516.”105
Moreover, “99% of all sales representatives in [a sample of ten MLMs] . . .
earned less than $14 a week (on average) in commissions (from downline)
while also earning less than ten dollars a week from their own sales.”106 As
one scholar notes:
[E]ven in the worst of the chain selling schemes…one can
find participants who are making a lot of money at or near
the top of their respective pyramids. The problem is not
that the company misstates such a person's income. The
problem is the company's intentional omissions and
implications suggest that such an income is typical and
attainable.107
When the true distribution of statistics is referenced, representatives from a
MLM may note that “[a]ny industry offering such substantial rewards and
carrying with it such a low dollar cost of entry will obviously tend to attract
some of the best and some of the worst entrepreneurs.”108 Despite the sunny
representations MLMs make to prospective clients, such push-back
incidentally suggests that the true distribution suffers from selection bias or,
alternatively, those consultants with lower incomes are working part time or
not hard enough.109
When numbers are cited by MLMs in their promotional materials, they
relate to sales, not the probability of those sales or per capita sales. For
example, one MLM informed its prospective consultants that “if they

105. Tiffany Lamoreaux, Home is where the Work is: Women, Direct Sales, and Technologies of
Gender (Apr. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) (on file with the Arizona
State University Digital Repository)
106. Id. at 190.
107. Pareja, supra note 19, at 96.
108. Jeffrey A. Babener, Network Marketing and the Law, 24 VA. B. A. NEWS J. 12, 12 (1998).
109. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 198. See, e.g., WILBUR CROSS, AMWAY: THE TRUE STORY OF
THE COMPANY THAT TRANSFORMED THE LIVES OF MILLIONS xv (Berkeley Pub. Corp. 1999), provides a
history of the company: “[I]t was clearly recorded, in surveys of the demographics of salespersons, that
99.9 percent were independent contractors rather than employees.” One apt analogy to the MLM industry
might be fantasy sports, where only a few participants win large payouts at the expense of the pool, even
though the sites appear to market fantasy sports as games that do not necessarily require experience. See
N. Cameron Leishman, Daily Fantasy Sports as Game of Chance: Distinction Without a Meaningful
Difference?, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1043, 1055 (2016); N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G.
Schneiderman Announces $12 Million Settlement With Draftkings And Fanduel (Oct. 25, 2016), https://
ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-12-million-settlement-draftkings-and-fanduel [http
s://perma.cc/2HVZ-ENVM].
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‘market[ed] just five memberships per week, [they would] receive $500 per
week!’ [yet] very few representatives . . . consistently sold five memberships
a week” at that particular MLM.110
Overall, the recruitment methods of MLM firms engender optimism,
rationally so — the theoretical economic model mentioned in Part II suggests
that a consultant will only bear a loss where she thinks she would be a high
performer but is actually a low performer. By highlighting only extremely
successful examples and emphasizing that consultant effort necessarily leads
to success,111 the MLM company perpetuates this optimism without
providing any information that might help the consultant determine her
future performance.
While it should be expected that a profit-maximizing MLM would desire
to highlight only success stories, in addition to highlighting benefits, at least
some MLM companies ignore mentioning costs.112 The omission of costs
furthers present bias and hampers the consumer’s ability to make a rational
cost-benefit calculation.
Ignorance of costs takes several hidden forms. First, it may mean not
mentioning costs in the distribution of salaries. In Herbalife’s disclosure of
consumer earnings, no consultant costs appear to have been mentioned —
just gross revenue.113
Second, “from signing up to remaining active, direct selling may come
with more costs than consultants realize.”114 MLM companies often stress
that “direct selling requires no special training or skill, [with] ‘low’ start-up
costs,”115 appealing to lower-income or otherwise frugal prospects.
However, even if a company does not require inventory to be purchased, they
may stress the purchase of “demonstration kits” (e.g., catalogs, sample
products) to enhance one’s selling business.116
Frequently-updated
demonstration kits obscure later-occurring costs,117 potentially holding less
saliency to prospective consultants.118 Other fees may be mandatory but only
noted in the boilerplate: At ACN, if a consultant does not request quickly
enough that her sales revenue be sent to her, she may be charged an Account
110. Duhigg, supra note 93.
111. In the following Part, I argue that the MLM industry’s emphasis on grit makes it possible to
assume high incomes are attainable.
112. See Vander Nat, supra note 35, at 141.
113. See Keep, supra note 19, at 204.
114. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 184.
115. Id. at 183.
116. The MLM may require you to sign a claim that demonstration kits are not required. See e.g.,
ACN, supra note 3.
117. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 183–184; see also O’Donnell, supra note 26.
118. See BAR-GILL, supra note 32, at 93.

3_LIU_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

126

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

4/26/2018 12:16 PM

Vol. 14:1

Maintenance Fee to access where her revenue is stored.119 Legal disclaimers
that indicate potential economic losses may also take the form of easily
skimmed-over boilerplate language.120 Even after the recruiting event,
consultants are asked to “certify that no claims of guaranteed profits or
representations of expected earnings that might result from [their] efforts as
an IBO have been made by [the MLM] or [the] sponsor.”121
Finally, while the Amway Safeguards were meant to protect potential
consultants, it may provide a sense of false security to a MLM’s business
soundness. Recall that the Amway test suggests that a MLM company was
not unlawful if it provides performance bonuses conditional on a certain
amount of sales to a certain number of customers,122 and provides an
opportunity for consultants to sell back inventory with a penalty.123
However, corporations are allowed to buy back their inventory at a discount
— a penalty or cost that is not highlighted in the recruitment materials.124
Additionally, it is unclear who enforces the underlying conditions for
bonuses, such that consultants may occasionally purchase their own
inventory to maintain their discount or bonus levels.125 Note that even if the
consultant feels like this is forward-thinking behavior (i.e., contrary to
present bias), she is likely overoptimistic about her prospects.
2. At Signing of the Agreement
Even if the MLM provides relevant information, it will be difficult to
find. This is especially amplified in the agreements signed between
consultants and MLMs, where the design of the contract may cause
confusion. For example, take ACN’s Independent Business Owner
Agreement, which asks the user to affirm that she “ha[s] read and agreed to
be bound by all of the Terms and Conditions” of several agreements.126 The

119. See ACN, supra note 3.
120. See Pareja, supra note 19, at 96. See also Daniels, supra note 43, at 548: “[I]t is not the act of
recruitment which makes pyramid schemes suspect but the method of recruiting through unrealistic
promises and mandatory investment.”
121. ACN, supra note 3.
122. I.e., by requiring that a consultant must sell 70% of her inventory to 10 different customers each
month in order to receive a performance bonus. See In re Amway Corp., Inc., et al., 93 F.T.C. 618, 668
(1979).
123. See ibid.
124. ACN, for instance, buys back unsold inventory at 90% of the cost to the consultant. ACN,
supra note 3.
125. See Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 184.
126. ACN, supra note 3.
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referenced materials, however, appear to be only viewable after the potential
consultant has signed the agreement online.127
While the FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule now requires a cooling-off
period — the opportunity to have seven business days to renege on a signed
consultant contract128 — for prospective consultants, recent research
suggests that cooling-off periods may actually entrench consultants or other
decision-makers in their decision.129 For example, prospective consultants
may fail to foresee how their lives may change with the time and money a
MLM requires due to projection bias.130 In some ways, people may have
already thought ahead and envisioned their status as a successful consultant,
such that revoking the contract may seem like a loss or a sunk cost of time.131
Finally, even if a consultant says that they plan to stay in the MLM
industry for a certain amount of time or until they make a certain amount of
revenue, their projection bias may not account for the fact that their attitudes
towards the MLM industry may change, just as those attitudes may have
already changed in the recruiting process.132 Coupled with the planning
fallacy, in which people are prone to underestimate how much time their
goals might take,133 a consultant might spend longer in an MLM than they
had originally planned.
B. PROMISES OF IDENTITY ENHANCEMENT.
Another practice of MLMs is to emphasize how the company may
enhance a consultant’s identity. For example, the official ACN website
displays the following from a testimonial: “It’s often said that ACN is a

127. Id.
128. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 76859.
129. See Sven Hoeppner, The Unintended Consequence of Doorstep Consumer Protection: Surprise,
Reciprocation, and Consistency, 38 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 247, 255 (2014) (citing George Loewenstein, Ted
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1209,
1209–1248 (2003)).
130. See generally, e.g., Meghan R. Busse et al., The Psychological Effect of Weather on Car
Purchases, 130 Q. J. ECON. 371, 371–414 (where car purchases are highly sensitive to weather suggesting
that people are not properly anticipating the future).
131. See Courtenay Atwell, The Franchisee as a Consumer: Determining the Optimal Duration of
Pre-Contractual Disclosure, 38 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 457, 482 (2015).
132. See generally George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in
Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1209, 1209–1248 (2003); Busse et al., supra note 130.
133. See generally, e.g., Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin & Michael Ross, Exploring the “Planning
Fallacy”: Why People Underestimate Their Task Completion Times, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 366, 366–81 (1994).
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personal development program with a compensation plan attached[.]”134 In
doing so, MLMs play up the relative salience and benefits of non-financial
considerations.135
In particular, MLMs offer a narrative linked to American civil religion
— the sociological proposition that nonsectarian religious symbols are often
connected to American-exceptionalism values,136 including “boundless faith
in the [potential] of economic growth and prosperity.”137 In MLM recruiting
materials, both subtle and overt religious tones are often used, e.g., the word
“blessing” is used frequently with regard to profits.138 In an example of these
overtones, the history of Amway starts with the following: “In this book you
will find the same insights . . . that have served as a guiding light and a
resource for millions of people around the earth to create a more rewarding
life.”139 Indeed, recruitment methods for at least some MLMs have often
been compared to recruitment into religious organizations.140
Altogether, the belief linked to American civil religion that “[b]oth God
and the market should be left free . . . to reward correct behavior and punish
the evil or lazy”141 plays into the mythology of the self-made man142 and can
be translated into two mythical values removed from actual religious belief
but tied to identity: (1) Grit (the idea that outcome is perfectly correlated with
effort) and (2) independence. The first value sustains MLM consultants’
optimism in the face of potential losses, while the second value reduces the
focus on economic losses altogether.

134. Danny Volonino, http://acninc.com/news/company/2011/11/07/acn-and-personal-developm
ent-danny-volonino-svp (last visited Mar. 21, 2018) (Note that I also saw this on the ACN website’s
header with the same attribution; however, the website rotates through a series of quotes.); ACN, supra
note 1.
135. See Keep, supra note 19, at 202.
136. See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 134 DAEDALUS 40, 42 (2005); see generally
KATE BOWLER, BLESSED: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PROSPERITY GOSPEL (2013).
137. Dick Anthony & Thomas Robbins, Spiritual Innovation and the Crisis of American Civil
Religion, 111 DAEDALUS 215, 216 (1982).
138. See Epstein, supra note 44, at 98 (citing Pareja, supra note 19, at 119–20).
139. CROSS, supra note 109, at ix.
140. See generally Patralekha Bhattacharya & Krishna Kumar Mehta, Socialization in Network
Marketing Organizations: Is it Cult Behavior?, 29 J. SOCIO-ECON. 361, 361–74 (2000).
141. Simon M. Coleman, America Loves Sweden, Prosperity Theology and the Globalization of Civil
Religion, in RELIGION AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF CAPITALISM: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES
(Richard H. Roberts ed., 1995).
142. Also known as the rags-to-riches tale; see generally Seymour Martin Lipset, American
Exceptionalism Reaffirmed, 2 INT’L REV. SOC. 256 (1988).
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In the social psychological literature, situations that emphasize particular
identities (i.e., priming) may cause behavior changes among individuals.143
As such, one could imagine a situation in which situations that stress
particularly religious or gendered themes alongside MLM opportunities may
cause potential consultants to engage further with MLMs. These contexts
would serve as a social norm or reference point for what the consultant
“should” do.
In turn, these norms might lead to a consultant staying on with her MLM
even when she is losing money for three reasons. First, consultants who
leave MLMs may not necessarily have plans for the next steps — MLM is a
default path, and the people they work with have clear instructions for how
to sell products. The logistical difficulty of starting something new creates
inertia that ultimately keeps the consultant from exiting the MLM. Second,
given that the majority of individuals are loss-averse, the consultant may
want to continue working until she breaks even. The consultant may exhibit
the sunk-cost fallacy here — if she believes that she has already put too much
time in this endeavor to fail. Third, there is evidence that violating
prescribed stereotypes about, for example, being American or female may
result in social sanctions by others.144 The consultant may not only view her
work as a failure, but also herself.145 MLMs’ emphasis on grit and
independence may compound all of these beliefs.
1. Grit
Consider Amway, which one author described as “the most thoroughly
American business in America . . . [i]n conception, in design, in basic
economic philosophy, even in its very name itself.”146 That same author
describes one of Amway’s values as follows: “If people are to be held
accountable, then it is necessary that their performances be evaluated and

143. See generally Daniel Benjamin, James Choi & Joshua Strickland, Social Identity and
Preferences, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1913, 1913–1928 (2010); Carol Dweck & Ellen Leggett, A SocialCognitive Approach to Motivation and Personality, 95 PSYCHOL. REV. 256, 256–73 (1988).
144. See generally, e.g., Alice Eagly & Steven Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward
Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 573–598 (2002); Alice Eagly & Mary Kite, Are Stereotypes of
Nationalities Applied to Both Women and Men?, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 451, 451–62
(1987).
145. See generally Paul Davies, Steven Spencer & Claude Steele, Clearing the Air: Identity Safety
Moderates the Effects of Stereotype Threat on Women’s Leadership Aspirations, 88 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 276, 276–87 (2005) (showing that an individual’s confidence in her identity reduces the
psychological effect of stereotype threat, i.e., behaving more consistently with a particular stereotype).
146. See CHARLES PAUL CONN, THE POSSIBLE DREAM: A CANDID LOOK AT AMWAY 103 (Fleming
H. Revell Co. 1977).
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susceptible to judgment and the resulting rewards or penalties. People reap
what they sow, and they must be taught in school, at home, on the job, and
in all walks of life.”147 Amway appears to use Biblical imagery148 in this
value to reinforce the belief that grit leads to success.
This belief appears consistently across MLM companies, where “success
is considered to be a consequence of skill and attitude.”149 Thus, consultants
who are not currently experiencing success must have a positive attitude to
obtain further success.150 In contrast, “self-doubt is a sign of weakness and
failure.”151 Failed consultants are considered the unmotivated majority:
“Many simply do not have the stick-to-it attitude that characterizes the
successful Amway distributor.”152 Yet, in one survey study of MLM
consultants, job satisfaction was positively correlated with organizational
commitment153 but negatively correlated with job performance,154 perhaps
suggesting that optimism not only masks economic losses but may also
prevent consultants from taking corrective steps earlier. Even the disclaimer
ACN uses regarding potential economic loss emphasizes effort: “Success as
an ACN Representative is not guaranteed, but rather influenced by an
individual's specific efforts. Not all ACN Independent Representatives make
a profit and no one can be guaranteed success as an ACN Independent
Representative.”155
Recruiters often stress that “in contrast to traditional corporate
employment, direct selling is a meritocratic industry . . . . [A]n individual’s
race, class, age, and/or gender are meaningless in direct selling because
success comes to those who simply work hard enough.”156 This attitude
reinforces the optimism shown in the recruiting materials, discussed later.
However, it is likely that lower-income consultants will have networks with
less disposable income;157 MLMs ignore these structural realities.

147. CROSS, supra note 109, at 169.
148. See Galatians 6:7 (King James) (“[F]or whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.”)
149. Bone, supra note 42, at 116 (citing generally Peter Freund, Social Performances and their
Discontents: The Biopsychosocial Aspects of Dramaturgical Stress, in EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL LIFE 268–
94 (G. Bendelow & S. Williams eds., 1988)); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (U.C. Press 1983)).
150. See Bone, supra note 42, at 116; see HOCHSCHILD, supra note 149.
151. Ibid.
152. CROSS, supra note 109, at 42.
153. See Pumela Msweli-Mbanga, Predicting Turnover Behaviour of Direct Salespeople, 8 S. AFR.
BUS. REV. 14, 17 (2004).
154. See id. at 21.
155. ACN, supra note 3.
156. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 164–65.
157. See id. at 185.
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Ultimately, the attitude of the disclaimer combines two biases: The
fundamental attribution error and optimism. That is, a prospective
consultant may view another consultant’s failure due not only to the
consultant’s lack of talent but also due to their attitude — rather than the fact
that the industry is relatively high risk. Because the failure is due to
something that appears controllable, the prospective consultant may believe
that regardless of how risky MLMs are, she is better than the average
consultant.
Given that the attribution of success or failure falls squarely on
consultants, it seems likely that unsuccessful consultants will engage the
sunk cost fallacy.158 Some consultants, as mentioned earlier, may continue
in their MLMs because they feel as if they have given too much to end on a
losing note. Alternatively, other consultants may engage with sunk costs in
a novel — but still flawed — way. That is, the optimism of these consultants
allows them to (mistakenly) know that they will recoup their investment; they
are not afraid of having already lost some money because they will gain it
back.
Even in the face of repeated failure, MLM consultants may find it
difficult to remove themselves from MLMs altogether. As one reporter
whose mother was a consultant noted, “[t]his business was different from the
others, my mother insisted, and as long as she “worked it like a business”
she could succeed . . . . It is hard to go to bat against a true believer.”159
2. Independence
MLM companies also attempt to recast notions of success, shifting it
away from how much a consultant makes to how she can participate in the
workplace. MLM company origin stories often stress how they were
founded as respectable, early 20th century alternatives160 to “dangerous and
[un]glamorous…labor in the domestic, manufacturing, or agriculture
industry.”161 In particular, this idea that certain types of work were not
respectable enough appears to be particularly gendered, aligning with the
ideas of “middle-class evangelical Christian femininity.”162 Specifically,
158. “Some women left because of the debt they acquired while others held on to the belief that if
they worked hard enough they would eventually succeed.” Id. at 188 (citing Virginia Sole-Smith, The
Pink Pyramid Scheme, HARPER’S (July-Aug. 2009), 26–33).
159. Id. at 198.
160. See Lamoreaux, supra note 105 at 86.
161. Id. at 84. This was true in some cases — some of the most successful MLMs created
opportunities for black women. See Kathy Peiss, “Vital Industry” and Women’s Ventures:
Conceptualizing Gender in Twentieth Century Business History, 72 BUS. HIST. REV. 218, 233 (1998).
162. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 12 (citing Beth Kreydatus, “Enriching Women’s Lives”: The

3_LIU_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

132

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

4/26/2018 12:16 PM

Vol. 14:1

one sociologist found in her fieldwork that MLMs “deliberately tap into
women’s anxieties and desires to blend their perceived gender roles with
their need for income.”163
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the majority of MLM consultants are
women.164 It appears that “the most important and repeated motivation for
entering into direct sales . . . was the desire to be stay-at-home mothers — to
have freedom”165 while still engaging in “meaningful employment . . .
outside of waged labor.”166 To that end, MLM companies are compared
positively to profit-making “traditional corporate avenues.”167 Recruiting
materials may capitalize on gender stereotypes of women as “relationship
oriented, caretakers, and socializers,”168 suggesting that women are naturally
more gifted at MLM skillsets.
Independence means many things to consultants — a flexible schedule,
work-life balance, a way to provide goods and services that appear to align
with their values,169 and, in turn, a way to exercise their beliefs in a secular
workforce.170 But it also means a blurred boundary between work, home,
and religion. For consultants inexperienced with the workforce, this can lead
to underestimation of costs, as they may not account for the fact that they
may ask their children to help with packages and setup,171 document the
purchases they themselves made as business expenses,172 or count the hours
they have been working, particularly if their office is the home. To that end,
Mary Kay Approach to Beauty, Business, and Feminism,” BUS. & ECON. HIST. ON-LINE 3 (2005)). See
also id. at 95–100; see generally Katie Rose Sullivan and Helen Delaney, A femininity that ‘giveth and
taketh away’: \The prosperity gospel and postfeminism in the neoliberal economy, HUM. RELATIONS 1–
24 (2016).
163. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 44.
164. But note that “men represent a majority of the executive leadership of the direct selling
industry . . . and within direct selling affiliate [umbrella] organizations.” Id. at 162.
165. Id. at 102.
166. Ibid.
167. John R. Sparks & Joseph A. Schenk, Explaining the Effects of Transformational Leadership:
An Investigation of the Effects of Higher-Order Motives in Multilevel Marketing Organizations, 22 J.
ORG. BEHAV. 849, 852 (2001).
168. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 129; see also Pei-Chia Lan, Networking Capitalism: Network
Construction and Control Effects In Direct Selling, 43 SOC. Q. 165–184 (2002).
169. Sparks & Schenk, supra note 167 at 852, provide some potential justifications: “[E]ducational
toys advance the cause of children; weight management programmes enhance self-confidence.” To some
extent, the blurring of religion and business is an encouragement to consultants: In one study, “being able
to bring business together with private beliefs encouraged [a participant’s] recruitment” into a MLM
business. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 97.
170. Busher, supra note 14, at 12. See also Cheris Shun-Ching Chan, Reenchantment of the
Workplace: The Interplay of Religiosity and Rationality, 45 BERKELEY J. SOC. 42, 52–58 (2001).
171. See Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 105–106 (finding that MLM consultants users view their
office as home and vice versa).
172. See Vander Nat, supra note 35, at 141.
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the blurred boundary “provides an effective means of exerting control over
and eliciting affiliation from distributors.”173 The consultant will be more
committed to the organization174 because of its mental association with her
family.
Social interactions and social media also amplify the myth of
independence. “The act of selling is transformed into an imaginary featuring
making new friends, having fun, and caring about other people.”175 Thus,
the choice to enter a MLM feels less like an economic necessity and more of
a choice.176 At the same time, “MLMs establish elaborate systems of support
through which members receive guidance and leadership from each
other,”177 as can be seen through numerous Facebook groups and teams of
MLM sellers that advertise each other’s sales.178 Moreover, successful
consultants encourage others to “[t]rust the leadership and be coachable. If
you want what successful people have, just do what successful people do.”179
That is, consultants must still rely on the company to maintain their grit.
Finally, the benefits of independent employment leave the consultant
with few tangible entitlements from their MLM. Unlike traditional full-time
work, consultants do not receive health or retirement benefits.180 Although
some scholars argue that MLMs might personally empower low-income
consumers,181 they may also render them ineligible for safety net
provisions.182 Consultants must sign independent contractor agreements
with indemnification and mandatory arbitration clauses.183 Further, they are
asked not to represent their relationship with the MLM company as more

173. Busher, supra note 14, at 12.
174. See generally Michael G. Pratt & José Antonio Rosa, Transforming Work-Family Conflict into
Commitment in Network Marketing Organizations, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 395 (2003).
175. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 129.
176. Indeed, social satisfaction is suggested as a reason for a prospective consultant to participate in
MLM. See Bhattacharya, supra note 140, at 369. However, it appears that excessive MLM activity by
consultants may cause friendships to actually weaken, as people become irritated by solicitations. See
Kent Grayson, Friendship Versus Business in Marketing Relationships, 71 J. Marketing 121, 132 (2007).
177. Sparks, supra note 169, at 851.
178. See, e.g., Lula Roe Down, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/groups/lula.roedown/
[https://perma.cc/N33B-RN8T] (a website where clothes are sold by groups of consultants).
179. Spencer & Leanna Hunn — Enjoying the Fruits of Their Labor, ACN (Apr. 15, 2017), http://
theacnopportunity.shenellwhyte.com/acntelecomcanadamlm/acn-spencer-leanna-hunn.html [https://per
ma.cc/9C3Z-Z2XC].
180. See Busher, supra note 14, at 18.
181. See id. at 19.
182. See id. at 18.
183. See ACN, supra note 3.
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significant than it is184 — even as ACN displays a blog post titled “10
Reasons Why ACN Can Change Your Life.”185
IV. CONCLUSION
In this discussion of MLMs, I have noted several suggested policies,
each with potentially mixed results or unanticipated consequences. First,
cooling-off periods might allow time for consumers to justify their
involvement in an MLM rather than question it. Second, other actions that
are meant to lower costs once people join — for example, lowering upfront
fees so that people can “try out” the MLM, or a more lenient buy-back policy
so that customers are not stuck with inventory186 — will not necessarily
correct for consultants’ optimism, especially if the belief that grit is perfectly
correlated with success is persistent. Moreover, these relatively generous
policies might, like the Amway safeguards, make prospective consultants
feel overly secure with their financial prospects. Third, regulating what and
how information about a MLM is disclosed to consumers has proven
somewhat politically unfeasible at the federal level,187 especially given the
ties between the MLM industry and the current administration.188 When the
final version of the Business Opportunity Rule was distributed in 2011, the
FTC reiterated its stance, stating that it would be difficult for MLMs to craft
an earnings disclosure given the heterogeneity of consultants (i.e., some
work part time, some full time, and others intermittently), such that
“disclosure would not provide prospective MLM participants with an
accurate account of the MLM experience or with information necessary to
make an informed purchasing decision.”189
That said, simplifying disclosure has been done in other fields. It might
be more politically feasible to pass enhanced consumer protection and
disclosure laws at the state level. One could imagine, for example, a
standardized handout (or website) accompanying each MLM that showed
184. See id. The relevant clause in the ACN Independent Business Owner Agreement states, “I agree
to make no false or misleading statements regarding the ACN Products or about the various relationships
between ACN, the ACN Provider(s) and me.”
185. Tracy Tippetts, 10 Reasons Why ACN Can Change Your Life, ACN (Apr. 17, 2013), http://
acninc.co-m/news/company/2013/04/17/whyacn [https://perma.cc/N7W8-3TGH].
186. Coughlan, supra note 40, at 13; Daryl Koehn, Ethical Issues Connected with Multilevel
Marketing Schemes, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 153, 156 (2001).
187. See discussion supra Part II.
188. In addition to the president’s endorsements of ACN, the current Secretary of Education, Betsy
DeVos, is married to the son of Amway’s founder. Noam Scheiber, Betsy DeVos, Trump’s Education
Pick, Plays Hardball with Her Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2017, at A1.
189. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 76823.
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the average revenue, costs and hours worked, both nationally and in the
metro area of the prospective consultant. At least one private-sector website
has already attempted to provide standardized venues in which MLMs could
be compared against one another; while the design is simple, the website
uses metrics such as “expected payout after selling $1,000” and “startup kit
price.”190 As mentioned previously, however, these metrics do not address
the issues of how likely it is for a consultant to sell $1,000 of product or the
fact that a low startup kit price may make hidden fees less salient.191 Even
if relevant information is provided to consumers, it may still be framed with
an eye towards behavioral biases.192 The common shortcoming of these
consumer-facing interventions is that they might create a cat-and-mouse
game between marketers and regulators,193 where marketers attempt to
discover and exploit other behavioral biases. Nonetheless, it is not clear
which behavioral interventions might succeed. Future research in the field
should test these areas.
Even if regulating information disclosure to consumers does not
necessarily change their behavior, due to the cat-and-mouse game, it is still
important for MLMs to release more data on earnings and costs. In the same
way the EEOC collects employee demographic and salary data, for
example,194 the FTC could collect MLM data for preliminary analysis and
potential enforcement.195 MLM companies might argue that they are so
decentralized that it would be nearly impossible to aggregate this
information, as they argued when the Business Opportunity Rule was being
crafted, but that argument neglects the fact that costs and revenue data (in
the form of inventory orders and sales data respectively) ultimately pass
through their organizations. Furthermore, even if MLM consultants are
considered independent contractors, the consulting agreements they sign
require them to abide by the MLM’s policies. As such, the MLM is not
prevented from implementing a policy where consultants must log the hours
190. See, e.g., CareerTrends, HERBALIFE, http://work-at-home.careertrends.com/l/48/Herbalife (last
visited Apr. 20, 2017).
191. See supra Part III.
192. See, e.g., HERBALIFE, supra note 22, which does not clearly indicate that half of “active sellers”
make no extra commission from Herbalife.
193. See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1648–1649 (2014).
194. See Pareja, supra note 19, at 89; Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, EEOC to Collect Summary Pay Data (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/news
room/release/9-29-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/AXB5-A8M4].
195. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra note 194; Heidi
Liu, More Data, More Problems? Why the Proposed EEO-1 Data Collection is a Net Gain, ON LABOR
(Apr. 12, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/04/12/more-data-more-problems-why-the-proposed-eeo-1data-collection-is-a-net-gain/ [https://perma.cc/QMN2-D9U7].
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they work. Because this data would not necessarily be used towards
disclosures to individual consultants, concerns about coarsely estimated
earnings serving as “inaccurate accounts of the MLM experience”196 would
be diminished.
Another suggested point of intervention is to equip trade associations to
ensure that their members are acting ethically, such that membership in the
association is an accurate signal of quality. There have been attempts to do
this. For instance, one commentator notes that “MLMs who have joined the
Direct Selling Association [the most prominent lobbying group in the
industry197], agree not to hide behind the ‘independent contractor’ status of
their sales forces in an effort to avoid responsibility for what their sales force
does.”198 Still, it is unclear how the Direct Selling Association has enforced
this and what incentive the organization would have for restraining its
members.
In addition to studying the effects of potential behavioral interventions
or regulations on MLM consultants, another important area of research is in
the conditions under which MLMs (and potential interventions) exist.
Changing these conditions could help make behavioral interventions
efficacious and more specifically targeted. For example, one group of
researchers suggests three areas of research: (1) “[T]he relative value of
tangible and intangible rewards associated with becoming a MLM
distributor,”199 (2) the point when a distributor chooses to no longer
participate, and (3) “the low level of complaints by victims of pyramid
scheme fraud.” 200
Differences among MLMs are also worth considering. For instance,
there are several different ways in which MLMs distribute bonuses amongst
consultants. These incentive structures may attract participants of different
risk propensities, or shape risk propensities themselves. Alternatively, it is
possible that the participant is not aware of these differences.201 If some
types of MLMs are more prone to unethical behavior than others, data from
FTC settlements could help shed light on what types of MLMs undergo
enforcement.
196. See FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 76823; discussion supra
Part II.
197. See FTC Business Opportunity Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 16110, 16114 (proposed Mar. 26, 2008) (to
be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437).
198. Koehn, supra note 186, at 158.
199. Keep, supra note 19, at 205.
200. Ibid.
201. See Rod Nichols, Which Compensation Plan is the Best?, BETTERNETWORKER (Sept. 24, 2010,
12:59 PM), http://www.betternetworker.com/articles/view/sponsoring-and-recruiting/dealing-objections
/which-compensation-plan-best [https://perma.cc/NB7F-Y6ZP].
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Research on existing legal and policy differences across states may also
be helpful. For instance, various press articles seem to suggest that Utah is
a hub for MLM incorporations due to a high level of trust in the
community202 — although this has rarely been supported with empirical
data.203 It seems possible that the identity norms articulated in Part III might
dovetail with Utah’s population, which is both highly religious and has a
relatively high proportion of women outside the traditional labor force.204
Understanding the circumstances under which MLM-relevant policies form
is important for understanding their potential consequences. Ultimately,
given the lack of information around the industry itself, the legal landscape
MLMs reside in is ripe for further study.

202. See id.
203. See Pareja, supra note 19, at 88 n.30; Alice Hines, How Utah Became a Bizarre, Blissful
Epicenter for Get-Rich-Quick Schemes, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 9, 2015), http://talkingpoint
smemo.com/theslice/mormon-utah-valley-multilevel-marketing-thrive-doterra [https://perma.cc/8MLUHF8X]; Daryl Lindsey, Follow the Profit: How Mormon Culture Made Utah a Hotbed for Multi-Level
Marketers, KUTV (Sept. 8, 2016), http://kutv.com/news/local/follow-the-profit-how-mormon-culturemade-utah-a-hotbed-for-multi-level-marketers [https://perma.cc/P876-FZA4].
204. See Lindsey, supra note 203.
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